David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialectica 59 (3):331–345 (2005)
Dispositionalism is the view that the world is, ultimately, just a world of objects and their irreducible dispositions, and that such dispositions are, ultimately, the sole explanatory ground for the occurrence of events. This view is motivated, partly, by arguing that it affords, while non‐necessitarian views of laws of nature do not afford, an adequate account of our intuitions about which regularities are non‐accidental. I, however, argue that dispositionalism cannot adequately account for our intuitions about which regularities are non‐accidental. Further, I argue that, intuitions aside, if we suppose that our world contains objects along with their irreducible dispositions, we must suppose, on pain of logical incoherence, that it contains laws of nature that are incompatible with a dispositionalist ontology. Indeed, if we suppose a world of objects and irreducible dispositions, we will have to suppose that the most prominent views of laws of nature currently on offer are all inadequate
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
B. D. Ellis (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.
Nancy Cartwright (1989). Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
George Molnar (2003). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Joel Katzav (2013). Dispositions, Causes, Persistence As Is, and General Relativity. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):41-57.
Travis Dumsday (2016). Lowe's Unorthodox Dispositionalism. Res Philosophica 93 (1):79-101.
Similar books and articles
Neil E. Williams (2011). Putting Powers Back on Multi-Track. Philosophia 39 (3):581-595.
Toby Handfield (2008). Humean Dispositionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126.
Stathis Psillos (2006). What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):137-156.
John Russon (2006). The Elements of Everyday Life. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (2):84-90.
Anna Marmodoro (2010). Do Powers Need Powers to Make Them Powerful?: From Pandispositionalism to Aristotle. In History of Philosophy Quarterly. Routledge 337 - 352.
Neil E. Williams (2010). Puzzling Powers: The Problem of Fit. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge 84--105.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #78,631 of 1,911,526 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #253,681 of 1,911,526 )
How can I increase my downloads?