David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (1):87-113 (2011)
This paper examines Nietzsche’s concept of unified agency. A widespread consensus has emerged in the secondary literature on three points: (1) Nietzsche’s notion of unity is meant to be an analysis of freedom; (2) unity refers to a relation between the agent’s drives or motivational states; and (3) unity obtains when one drive predominates and imposes order on the other drives. I argue that these claims are philosophically and textually indefensible. In contrast, I argue that (1′) Nietzschean unity is an account of the distinction between genuine actions and mere behaviors, rather than between free and unfree actions; (2′) unity refers to a relation between drives and conscious thought; and (3′) unity obtains when the agent’s attitude toward her own action is stable under the revelation of further information about the action’s etiology. I show that Nietzsche develops this notion of unity by drawing on Plato’s and Schiller’s accounts of unified agency.
|Keywords||Nietzsche agency unity Schiller activity passivity genuine action mere behavior|
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Donald Rutherford (2011). Freedom as a Philosophical Ideal: Nietzsche and His Antecedents. Inquiry 54 (5):512 - 540.
Paul Katsafanas (2013). Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, Edited by ChristopherJanaway and SimonRobertson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, Ix + 262 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-958367-6 Hb $75.00. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 21:e9-e14.
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