Conditionals right and left: Probabilities for the whole family [Book Review]

Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (1):1 - 53 (2009)
The fact that the standard probabilistic calculus does not define probabilities for sentences with embedded conditionals is a fundamental problem for the probabilistic theory of conditionals. Several authors have explored ways to assign probabilities to such sentences, but those proposals have come under criticism for making counterintuitive predictions. This paper examines the source of the problematic predictions and proposes an amendment which corrects them in a principled way. The account brings intuitions about counterfactual conditionals to bear on the interpretation of indicatives and relies on the notion of causal (in)dependence.
Keywords Standard probabilistic calculus  Embedded conditionals  Probabilistic theory of conditionals  Causal independence
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DOI 10.2307/40344052
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour & Richard Scheines (1996). Causation, Prediction, and Search. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):113-123.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Causal Premise Semantics. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1136-1170.

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