David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (1):1 - 53 (2009)
The fact that the standard probabilistic calculus does not define probabilities for sentences with embedded conditionals is a fundamental problem for the probabilistic theory of conditionals. Several authors have explored ways to assign probabilities to such sentences, but those proposals have come under criticism for making counterintuitive predictions. This paper examines the source of the problematic predictions and proposes an amendment which corrects them in a principled way. The account brings intuitions about counterfactual conditionals to bear on the interpretation of indicatives and relies on the notion of causal (in)dependence.
|Keywords||Standard probabilistic calculus Embedded conditionals Probabilistic theory of conditionals Causal independence|
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References found in this work BETA
Ernest Adams (1998). A Primer of Probability Logic. Stanford: Csli Publications.
Ernest Adams (1965). The Logic of Conditionals. Inquiry 8 (1-4):166 – 197.
Ernest W. Adams (1970). Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals. Foundations of Language 6 (1):89-94.
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Citations of this work BETA
J. Robert G. Williams (2012). Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
Paul Égré & Mikaël Cozic (2011). If-Clauses and Probability Operators. Topoi 30 (1):17-29.
Morteza Dehghani, Rumen Iliev & Stefan Kaufmann (2012). Causal Explanation and Fact Mutability in Counterfactual Reasoning. Mind and Language 27 (1):55-85.
Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Causal Premise Semantics. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1136-1170.
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