Fittingness and Idealization

Ethics 124 (3):572-588 (2014)
Abstract
This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly ideal when the most robust way of avoiding W-type practical problems is deferring to her endorsement
Keywords Fitting Attitudes Analysis  Subjectivism  Value  Ideal Subjectivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Antti Kauppinen, Fittingness and Idealization
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Jens Johansson (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247 - 256.
Richard Double (2004). The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422.
Mark Johnston (2004). Subjectivism and Unmasking. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):187-201.
Chris Heathwood (2008). Fitting Attitudes and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2013-06-22

Total downloads

127 ( #6,746 of 1,098,129 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

48 ( #1,353 of 1,098,129 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.