- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Deterrence, utility, and rational choice
Theory and Decision 12 (1):41-60 (1980)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)My notes
Similar books and articles
Deterrence, utility, and rational choice? A comment.Georges Bernard - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (1):89-97.
Persons and the satisfaction of preferences: Problems in the rational kinematics of values.Duncan MacIntosh - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):163-180.
Consequentialism and rational choice: Lessons from the Allais paradox.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
Deterrence and utility again: A response to Bernard.Gregory S. Kavka - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (1):99-102.
Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers.Isaac Levi - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):1-17.
Interpersonal utility in principles of social choice.Paul Weirich - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (3):295 - 317.
Random behavior and the as-if defense of rational choice theory in demand experiments.Ivan Moscati & Paola Tubaro - unknown
Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):9-32.
Is Nuclear Deterrence Paradoxical?:Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism. John Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez; Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. Gregory Kavka. [REVIEW]Jeff McMahan - 1989 - Ethics 99 (2):407-.
Rational Cooperation, Irrational Retaliation.Joseph Mintoff - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):362-380.
Revealed Preference and Expected Utility.Stephen A. Clark - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
A Theory of Rational Choice under Ignorance.Klaus Nehring - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (3):205-240.
Analytics
Added to PP
2013-01-04
Downloads
47 (#331,642)
6 months
3 (#1,002,413)
2013-01-04
Downloads
47 (#331,642)
6 months
3 (#1,002,413)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
"Deterrence,".S. M. Amadae - 2015 - In Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 99-140.
Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear Leviathan.S. M. Amadae - 2018 - In Daniel Bessner & Nicolas Guilhot (eds.), The Decisionist Imagination: Democracy, Sovereignty and Social Science in the 20th Century. New York, NY, USA:
Uncertainty as the Reason for Action: Last Opportunity and Future Climate Disaster.Henry Shue - 2015 - Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 8 (2).
Deterrence, utility, and rational choice? A comment.Georges Bernard - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (1):89-97.
References found in this work
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Edited by R. B. Braithwaite.
Maximization of Expected Utility as a Criterion of Rationality in Military Strategy and Foreign Policy.Robert P. Wolff - 1970 - Social Theory and Practice 1 (1):99-111.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-7c76586df8-hc2g5 uwo