Moral Realism and Arbitrariness

Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):109-129 (2005)
In this paper I argue (i) that choosing to abide by realist moral norms would be as arbitrary as choosing to abide by the mere preferences of a God (a difficulty akin to the Euthyphro dilemma raised for divine command theorists); in both cases we would lack reason to prefer these standards to alternative codes of conduct. I further develop this general line of thought by arguing in particular (ii) that we would lack any noncircular justification to concern ourselves with any such realist normative standards.
Keywords divine command  moral realism  moral normativity  arbitrariness  moral reasoning  euthyphro dilemma
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2005.tb01946.x
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Jeremy Fantl (2006). Is Metaethics Morally Neutral? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.

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