The experience machine and mental state theories of well-being
Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387 (1999)
| Abstract | It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our mental states is compatible with maintaining that the impact of such values upon our well-being lies in their impact upon our mental lives. | |||||||||
| Keywords | experience machine hedonism mental state Nozick welfare well-being | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesBaron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Francis V. Raab (1965). Of Minds and Molecules. Philosophy of Science 32 (January):57-72.
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Eduardo Rivera-lópez (2007). Are Mental State Welfarism and Our Concern for Non-Experiential Goals Incompatible? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):74–91.
Adam J. Kolber (1994). Mental Statism and the Experience Machine. Bard Journal of Social Sciences 3:10-17.
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