The experience machine and mental state theories of well-being

Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387 (1999)
Abstract
It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our mental states is compatible with maintaining that the impact of such values upon our well-being lies in their impact upon our mental lives.
Keywords experience machine  hedonism  mental state  Nozick  welfare  well-being
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
    Alex Barber (2011). Hedonism and the Experience Machine. Philosophical Papers 40 (2):257 - 278.
    Matt Ferkany (2012). The Objectivity of Wellbeing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):472-492.
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