David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 2 (4):415-434 (1987)
Many authors, including paleobiologists, cladists and so on, adopt a nested hierarchical viewpoint to examine the relationships among different levels of biological organization. Furthermore, species are often considered to be unique entities in functioning evolutionary processes and one of the individuals forming a nested hierarchy.I have attempted to show that such a hierarchical view is inadequate in evolutionary biology. We should define units depending on what we are trying to explain. Units that play an important role in evolution and ecology do not necessarily form a nested hierarchy. Also the relationships among genealogies at different levels are not simply nested. I have attempted to distinguish the different characteristics of passages when they are used for different purposes of explanation. In my analysis, species and monophyletic taxa cannot be uniquely defined as single units that function in ecological and evolutionary processes.
|Keywords||Units lineages evolution ecology hierarchy pluralism causality ontology species phylogeny|
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References found in this work BETA
A. F. Chalmers (1982/1994). What is This Thing Called Science?: An Assessment of the Nature and Status of Science and its Methods. Hackett Pub. Co..
Michael T. Ghiselin (1974). A Radical Solution to the Species Problem. Systematic Zoology 23:536-44.
Kent E. Holsinger (1984). The Nature of Biological Species. Philosophy of Science 51 (2):293-307.
David Hull (1976). Are Species Really Individuals? Systematic Zoology 25:174-91.
Philip Kitcher (1984). Species. Philosophy of Science 51 (2):308-333.
Citations of this work BETA
Arnold G. Kluge (1990). Species as Historical Individuals. Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):417-431.
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