Erkenntnis 40 (2):137-53 (1994)
|Abstract||Fodor and others who think that scientific, computational psychology will vindicate commonsense belief-desire psychology have maintained that belief can be identified with the explicit storage of a token with appropriate content. I review and develop problems for the explicit storage view and show that a more plausible account identifies belief with the disposition to use a token with appropriate content in explicit reasoning and planning processes and as a basis for action. I argue that this type of inner disposition account will also apply to most other common sense attitudes. The result is a realism about commonsense belief-desire psychology that is more modest than Fodor's: While such inner dispositions probably do exist, these states will probably not be the main focus of scientific psychological theories|
|Keywords||Belief Computation Epistemology Psychology|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Terence E. Horgan (1992). From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):449-484.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema 26 (1):131-137.
Paul R. Thagard (1990). Concepts and Conceptual Change. Synthese 82 (2):255-74.
Ilkka Pyysia¨Inen (2003). True Fiction: Philosophy and Psychology of Religious Belief. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):109-125.
Ilkka Pyysiäinen (2003). True Fiction: Philosophy and Psychology of Religious Belief. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):109 – 125.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-75.
Pat A. Manfredi (1993). Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
Consuelo Preti (2000). Belief and Desire Under the Elms. Protosociology 14:270-284.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What is This Thing Called 'Commonsense Psychology'? Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.
Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #131,679 of 722,787 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,384 of 722,787 )
How can I increase my downloads?