David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 62 (1):92-110 (1995)
I critically explore various forms of the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis. Many considerations, including the complexity of representational content and the systematicity of language understanding, support the view that some, but not all, of our mental representations occur in a language. I examine several arguments concerning sententialism and the propositional attitudes, Fodor's arguments concerning infant and animal thought, and Fodor's argument for radical concept nativism and show that none of these considerations require us to postulate a LOT that is innate or otherwise distinct from spoken languages. Instead, I suggest that we maintain the more conservative hypothesis, supported by introspection, that some of our thoughts occur in the languages that we speak
|Keywords||Language Mind Science Speech Thought|
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Shimon Edelman & Nathan Intrator (2003). Towards Structural Systematicity in Distributed, Statically Bound Visual Representations. Cognitive Science 23 (1):73-110.
Lawrence J. Kaye (1995). A Scientific Psychologistic Foundation for Theories of Meaning. Minds and Machines 5 (2):187-206.
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