On representing objects with a language of sentience
Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):113 – 127 (2008)
| Abstract | In his book A Theory of Sentience, Austen Clark argues that the content of sensory representations can be expressed as sentences constructed from a language of sentience. Such sentences specify that a determinate feature obtains in a particular space-time region, but the language's limited vocabulary prohibits the sentences from referring or attributing features to objects. In this paper, I show that this view is flawed in at least two ways. First, if sensation has the capacities that Clark and others attribute to it, then the vocabulary of sense extends further than he supposes, and a limited language of sentience cannot justify a prohibition of object representation within sentience. Second, even if the language of sentience is as impoverished as he claims, and thus even if the representational capacity of sentience is correspondingly limited, object individuation can plausibly occur at the level of sensation. In the course of defusing Clark's major argument for an “object-less” theory of sentience, I offer reasons to believe both that sensory representations can be impressively sophisticated in what they say about the world, and that object representations can be surprisingly basic. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMohan P. Matthen (2004). Features, Places, and Things: Reflections on Austen Clark's Theory of Sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):497-518.
Austen Clark (2000). Quality Space. In Austen Clar (ed.), A Theory of Sentience. Oxford University Press.
G. Berger (1987). On the Structure of Visual Sentience. Synthese 71 (June):355-70.
Andrew Linzey (2004). 'The Powers That Be': Mechanisms That Prevent Us Recognising Animal Sentience. Essays in Philosophy 5 (2):1-15.
Wallace I. Matson (1976). Sentience. University of California Press.
R. J. Hirst (1966). Sentience and Mr Myers. Mind 75 (January):122-124.
Austen Clark (2000). A Theory of Sentience. New York: Oxford University Press.
John Pickering (ed.) (1990). From Sentience To Symbols. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
Joseph Levine (2004). Thoughts on Sensory Representation: A Commentary on Austen Clark's a Theory of Sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):541-551.
Robert Kirk (1986). Sentience, Causation and Some Robots. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):308-21.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads3 ( #202,008 of 549,124 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,124 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
