Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42 (2009)
|Abstract||In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present several arguments in favor of our analysis of reasons for action. We then turn to consider a series of objections to the analysis. We conclude that there are good reasons to accept the analysis and that the objections do not succeed.|
|Keywords||Reasons Evidence Normativity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Pekka Väyrynen (2011). A Wrong Turn to Reasons? In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
Fred I. Dretske (1971). Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2008). Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? Ethics 119 (1):31-56.
G. F. Schueler (2003). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2013). Reasons, Facts‐About‐Evidence, and Indirect Evidence. Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):237-243.
Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (3):479 - 500.
Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads301 ( #602 of 722,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)59 ( #839 of 722,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?