David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42 (2009)
In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present several arguments in favor of our analysis of reasons for action. We then turn to consider a series of objections to the analysis. We conclude that there are good reasons to accept the analysis and that the objections do not succeed.
|Keywords||Reasons Evidence Normativity|
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Allen Coates (2013). The Enkratic Requirement. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.
Kieran Setiya (2014). What is a Reason to Act? Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
Andrew Jordan (2014). On Reasons, Evidence of Oughts, and Morally Fitting Motives. Philosophia 42 (2):391-403.
Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter (2009). Reasons as Right-Makers. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):279-296.
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