Responsibility for necessities

Philosophical Studies 155 (2):307-324 (2011)
Abstract
It is commonly held that no one can be morally responsible for a necessary truth. In this paper, I will provide various examples that cast doubt on this idea. I also show that one popular argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (van Inwagen’s Direct Argument) fails given my examples
Keywords Necessity  Moral responsibility  Free will  Determinism  Incompatibilism  Compatibilism  Direct Argument
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References found in this work BETA
John Martin Fischer (1996). A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):49-66.
John Martin Fischer (1982). Responsibility and Control. Journal of Philsophy 79 (January):24-40.

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