Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 155 (2):307-324 (2011)
|Abstract||It is commonly held that no one can be morally responsible for a necessary truth. In this paper, I will provide various examples that cast doubt on this idea. I also show that one popular argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (van Inwagen’s Direct Argument) fails given my examples|
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