David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):70-86 (2013)
This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis concerning normative reasons, proposed and defended in earlier papers. According to this thesis, a fact is a normative reason for an agent to Φ just in case this fact is evidence that this agent ought to Φ. John Broome and John Brunero have presented a number of challenging criticisms of this thesis which focus, for the most part, on problems that it appears to confront when it comes to the topic of the weighing of reasons. Our paper responds to all of the criticisms that these critics have provided, shedding fresh light on this interesting topic in the process
|Keywords||evidence normative reasons practical reasoning ought|
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Citations of this work BETA
John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
Andrew Jordan (2014). On Reasons, Evidence of Oughts, and Morally Fitting Motives. Philosophia 42 (2):391-403.
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