Weighing Reasons

Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):70-86 (2013)
Abstract
This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis concerning normative reasons, proposed and defended in earlier papers. According to this thesis, a fact is a normative reason for an agent to Φ just in case this fact is evidence that this agent ought to Φ. John Broome and John Brunero have presented a number of challenging criticisms of this thesis which focus, for the most part, on problems that it appears to confront when it comes to the topic of the weighing of reasons. Our paper responds to all of the criticisms that these critics have provided, shedding fresh light on this interesting topic in the process
Keywords evidence   normative reasons   practical reasoning   ought
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Stephen Kearns, Weighing Reasons
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-04-01

Total downloads

300 ( #1,453 of 1,413,175 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

36 ( #4,771 of 1,413,175 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.