Modelling vagueness: what can we ignore?

Philosophical Studies 161 (3):453-470 (2012)
Abstract
A theory of vagueness gives a model of vague language and of reasoning within the language. Among the models that have been offered are Degree Theorists’ numerical models that assign values between 0 and 1 to sentences, rather than simply modelling sentences as true or false. In this paper, I ask whether we can benefit from employing a rich, well-understood numerical framework, while ignoring those aspects of it that impute a level of mathematical precision that is not present in the modelled phenomenon of vagueness. Can we ignore apparent implications for the phenomena by pointing out that it is just a model and that the unwanted features are mere artefacts? I explore the distinction between representors and artefacts and criticise the strategy of appealing to features as mere artefacts in defence of a theory. I focus largely on theories using numerical resources, but also consider other, related theories and strategies, including theories appealing to non-linear structures.
Keywords Vagueness  Modelling  Sorites paradox  Degree theories  Artefacts
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References found in this work BETA
Kenton F. Machina (1976). Truth, Belief, and Vagueness. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1):47-78.

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