David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):459-467 (1984)
The principle, Ought implies can, Has two versions. The strong version expresses a necessary condition for the appropriateness of moral judgments; the weak version expresses a possible ground for excusing wrongdoing. The strong version is presupposed by choice-Morality, While the weak one is presupposed by character-Morality. It is argues that the strong version and choice-Morality are mistaken and that the weak version and character-Morality give a much more plausible account of our moral experience. The general conclusion is that choice is not necessary for the appropriateness of moral disapproval
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter B. M. Vranas (2007). I Ought, Therefore I Can. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167 - 216.
Thomas M. Besch (2011). Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity. Dialogue 50 (02):347-365.
Bart Streumer (2007). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
Frances Howard-Snyder (2006). “Cannot” Implies “Not Ought”. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):233 - 246.
Greg Janzen (2011). Is God's Belief Requirement Rational? Religious Studies 47 (4):465-478.
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