David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):459-467 (1984)
The principle, Ought implies can, Has two versions. The strong version expresses a necessary condition for the appropriateness of moral judgments; the weak version expresses a possible ground for excusing wrongdoing. The strong version is presupposed by choice-Morality, While the weak one is presupposed by character-Morality. It is argues that the strong version and choice-Morality are mistaken and that the weak version and character-Morality give a much more plausible account of our moral experience. The general conclusion is that choice is not necessary for the appropriateness of moral disapproval
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter B. M. Vranas (2007). I Ought, Therefore I Can. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167 - 216.
Thomas M. Besch (2011). Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity. Dialogue 50 (02):347-365.
Bart Streumer (2007). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
Frances Howard-Snyder (2006). “Cannot” Implies “Not Ought”. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):233 - 246.
Greg Janzen (2011). Is God's Belief Requirement Rational? Religious Studies 47 (4):465-478.
Similar books and articles
John S. Wilkins (forthcoming). Biological Essentialism and the Tidal Change of Natural Kinds. Science and Education.
Andrew Ward (2001). Values and Science. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (1):67-80.
Marzia Soavi (2009). Antirealism and Artefact Kinds. Techne 13 (2):93-107.
Matthew H. Kramer (2005). Moral Rights and the Limits of the Ought-Implies-Can Principle: Why Impeccable Precautions Are No Excuse. Inquiry 48 (4):307 – 355.
Fred Wilson (1982). Mill's Proof That Happiness is the Criterion of Morality. Journal of Business Ethics 1 (1):59 - 72.
Nicholas Unwin (1985). Relativism and Moral Complacency. Philosophy 60 (232):205-214.
Kevin Lynch (2012). A Multiple Realization Thesis for Natural Kinds. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):389-406.
Ralph Wedgwood (2013). Rational 'Ought' Implies 'Can'. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.
Shyam Ranganathan (2010). Does Kant Hold That Ought Implies Can? In J. Sharma A. Raguramaraju (ed.), Grounding Morality. Routledge. 60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads113 ( #10,537 of 1,139,819 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #20,229 of 1,139,819 )
How can I increase my downloads?