Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):533-6 (1977)
|Abstract||This note is a reply to nagel's "what is it like to be a bat?" I argue that nagel is right in claiming that members of each species have a unique point of view due to physiological differences; no member of another species can have the same experiences. Nagel is wrong, However, In concluding from this truism that no objective account of experiences is possible. Such an account can give everything physicalism needs. What it cannot give, And what it was not meant to give, Is the experience of living through the experience it explains|
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Physicalism Subjectivity Nagel, E|
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