Physicalism and subjectivity

This note is a reply to nagel's "what is it like to be a bat?" I argue that nagel is right in claiming that members of each species have a unique point of view due to physiological differences; no member of another species can have the same experiences. Nagel is wrong, However, In concluding from this truism that no objective account of experiences is possible. Such an account can give everything physicalism needs. What it cannot give, And what it was not meant to give, Is the experience of living through the experience it explains
Keywords Consciousness  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Subjectivity  Nagel, E
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2106432
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,280
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Pär Sundström (2002). Nagel's Case Against Physicalism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):91-108.
Torin Alter (2002). Nagel on Imagination and Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:143-58.
David R. Hiley (1978). Materialism and the Inner Life. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):61-70.
David R. Pugmire (1989). Bat or Batman. Philosophy 64 (April):207-17.
Shaffarullah Abdul Rahman (2008). Rethinking Nagel. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:189-197.
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Paul G. Muscari (1985). The Subjective Character of Experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6 (4):577-97.
Norman Malcolm (1988). Subjectivity. Philosophy 63 (April):147-60.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

107 ( #41,654 of 1,932,461 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #132,655 of 1,932,461 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.