The centrality of problem-solving

Inquiry 22 (1-4):405 – 421 (1979)
The aim of this paper is to provide the beginnings of a theory of justification. This theory is an alternative to the two currently available and unsatisfactory options: foundationalism and coherentism. Both of these theories, as well as the decisive sceptical objections to them, are committed to the assumption that there is only one context of justification and only one standard of justification. This assumption is mistaken. There are two contexts of justification, each with a standard peculiar to it. The consequence of this is the need for a radical reorientation in epistemology.
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DOI 10.1080/00201747908601880
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Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.

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