David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 22 (1-4):405 – 421 (1979)
The aim of this paper is to provide the beginnings of a theory of justification. This theory is an alternative to the two currently available and unsatisfactory options: foundationalism and coherentism. Both of these theories, as well as the decisive sceptical objections to them, are committed to the assumption that there is only one context of justification and only one standard of justification. This assumption is mistaken. There are two contexts of justification, each with a standard peculiar to it. The consequence of this is the need for a radical reorientation in epistemology.
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References found in this work BETA
Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
L. Laudan (1977). Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. University of California Press.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York, Humanities Press.
Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
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