David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Many distinct theories are compatible with current experience. Scientiﬁc realists recommend that we choose the simplest. Anti-realists object that such appeals to “Ockham’s razor” cannot be truth-conducive, since they lead us astray in complex worlds. I argue, on behalf of the realist, that always preferring the simplest theory compatible with experience is necessary for eﬃcient convergence to the truth in the long run, even though it may point in the wrong direction in the short run. Eﬃciency is a matter of minimizing errors or retractions prior to convergence to the truth.
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