Do 'Contextualist Cases' Support Contextualism?

Erkenntnis 76 (1):115-120 (2012)
This paper addresses the argument from ‘contextualist cases’—such as for instance DeRose’s Bank cases—to attributor contextualism. It is argued that these cases do not make a decisive case against invariantism and that the debate between contextualists and invariantists will have to be settled on broader theoretical grounds
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9330-y
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Patrick Rysiew, Epistemic Contextualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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