David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474 (2007)
According to one view about the rationality of belief, such rationality is ultimately nothing other than the rationality that one exhibits in taking the means to one’s ends. On this view, epistemic rationality is really a species or special case of instrumental rationality. In particular, epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality in the service of one’s distinctively cognitive or epistemic goals (perhaps: one’s goal of holding true rather than false beliefs). In my (2003), I dubbed this view the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality.
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Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2014). The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
Tom Roberts (2010). Understanding 'Sensorimotor Understanding'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):101-111.
Christopher Cowie (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79 (1):191-209.
Matthew Lockard (2013). Epistemic Instrumentalism. Synthese 190 (9):1701-1718.
Daniel Laurier (2013). Les Raisons Épistémiques Sont-Elles Instrumentales? Dialogue 52 (2):211-231.
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