Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474 (2007)
|Abstract||According to one view about the rationality of belief, such rationality is ultimately nothing other than the rationality that one exhibits in taking the means to one’s ends. On this view, epistemic rationality is really a species or special case of instrumental rationality. In particular, epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality in the service of one’s distinctively cognitive or epistemic goals (perhaps: one’s goal of holding true rather than false beliefs). In my (2003), I dubbed this view the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Byron (1998). Satisficing and Optimality. Ethics 109 (1):67-93.
Lara Buchak (2010). Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
Adam Leite (2007). Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456-464.
John Brunero (2005). Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):557 - 569.
Adam Leite (2007). Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly's "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456–464.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #39,306 of 739,398 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,288 of 739,398 )
How can I increase my downloads?