Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology

Erkenntnis 78 (2):245-252 (2013)
Pritchard (Synthese 175,133–51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9301-3
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief". In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 111-134.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Spyridon Orestis Palermos (2011). Belief-Forming Processes, Extended. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Christoph Kelp (2013). Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):265-278.
Shannon Spaulding (2012). Overextended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.
Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

60 ( #55,391 of 1,725,588 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #110,407 of 1,725,588 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.