Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception

Philosophy Compass 3 (5):933-955 (2008)
The concept of evidence is among the central concerns of epistemology broadly construed. As such, it has long engaged the intellectual energies of both philosophers of science and epistemologists of a more traditional variety. Here I briefly survey some of the more important ideas to have emerged from this tradition of reflection. I then look somewhat more closely at an issue that has recently come to the fore, largely as a result of Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits: that of whether one's evidence supervenes on one's non-factive mental states.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,265
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman (2012). Conciliationism and Uniqueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.
Matthew Kennedy (2010). Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.

View all 10 citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

138 ( #10,366 of 1,700,312 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

36 ( #15,982 of 1,700,312 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.