Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception

Philosophy Compass 3 (5):933-955 (2008)
Abstract
The concept of evidence is among the central concerns of epistemology broadly construed. As such, it has long engaged the intellectual energies of both philosophers of science and epistemologists of a more traditional variety. Here I briefly survey some of the more important ideas to have emerged from this tradition of reflection. I then look somewhat more closely at an issue that has recently come to the fore, largely as a result of Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits: that of whether one's evidence supervenes on one's non-factive mental states.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Matthew Kennedy (2010). Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.
    Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman (2012). Conciliationism and Uniqueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.
    Berislav Marušić (2011). The Ethics of Belief. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.

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