Formal Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science

Abstract
Formal learning theory is an approach to the study of inductive inference that has been developed by computer scientists. In this paper, I discuss the relevance of formal learning theory to such standard topics in the philosophy of science as underdetermination, realism, scientific progress, methodology, bounded rationality, the problem of induction, the logic of discovery, the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of psychology.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,392
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Oliver Schulte, Formal Learning Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Michael Schmid (1993). Verhaltenstheorie Versus Nutzentheorie. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 24 (2):275 - 292.
Colin Howson (2011). No Answer to Hume. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):279 - 284.
John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

8 ( #172,718 of 1,102,912 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #297,281 of 1,102,912 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.