How to be an Epistemic Permissivist

Abstract
Roger’s official statement of the thesis that he defends reads as follows: Uniqueness : If an agent whose total evidence is E is fully rational in taking doxastic attitude D to P, then necessarily, any subject with total evidence E who takes a different attitude to P is less than fully rational. Following Roger, I’ll call someone who denies Uniqueness a Permissivist . In what follows, I’ll argue against Uniqueness and defend Permissivism
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Citations of this work BETA
Sophie Horowitz (2013). Immoderately Rational. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-16.
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