Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1998)
In Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness, Pierre Keller examines Kant's theory of self-consciousness and argues that it succeeds in explaining how both subjective and objective experience are possible. Previous interpretations of Kant's theory have held that he treats all self-consciousness as knowledge of objective states of affairs, and also that self-consciousness can be interpreted as knowledge of personal identity. By developing this striking new interpretation Keller is able to argue that transcendental self-consciousness underwrites a general theory of objectivity and subjectivity at the same time.
|Keywords||Self-consciousness (Awareness) Self (Philosophy)|
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|Call number||B2799.S37.K45 1998|
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
Clinton Tolley (2012). Kant on the Content of Cognition. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.
Garry Young (2006). Kant and the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.
Chakravathi Ram-Prasad (2011). The Phenomenal Separateness of Self: Udayana on Body and Agency. Asian Philosophy 21 (3):323 - 340.
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