Kevin T. Kelly and Oliver Schulte
| Abstract | We argue that uncomputability and classical scepticism are both re ections of inductive underdetermination, so that Church's thesis and Hume's problem ought to receive equal emphasis in a balanced approach to the philosophy of induction. As an illustration of such an approach, we investigate how uncomputable the predictions of a hypothesis can be if the hypothesis is to be reliably investigated by a computable scienti c method. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesKevin T. Kelly & Clark Glymour (1992). Inductive Inference From Theory Laden Data. Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (4):391 - 444.
Paulo Sousa (2009). On Testing the 'Moral Law'. Mind and Language 24 (2):209-234.
Kevin T. Kelly (1991). Reichenbach, Induction, and Discovery. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):123 - 149.
Oliver Schulte, Formal Learning Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kevin T. Kelly, Oliver Schulte & Cory Juhl (1997). Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 64 (2):245-267.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads2 ( #232,211 of 548,969 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,969 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
