Learning Theory and Descriptive Set Theory

then essentially characterized the hypotheses that mechanical scientists can successfully decide in the limit in terms of arithmetic complexity. These ideas were developed still further by Peter Kugel [4]. In this paper, I extend this approach to obtain characterizations of identification in the limit, identification with bounded mind-changes, and identification in the short run, both for computers and for ideal agents with unbounded computational abilities. The characterization of identification with n mind-changes entails, as a corollary, an exact arithmetic characterization of Putnam's n-trial predicates, which closes a gap of a factor of two in Putnam's original characterization [12].
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Kevin T. Kelly (1988). Formal Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:413 - 423.
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