Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?
Noûs 39 (1):179 - 209 (2005)
| Abstract | A Moorean fact, in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. Lewis opens his seminal paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’ with the following declaration. | |||||||||
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