David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press 183--217 (2010)
My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some proposition: there is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, we might picture
|Keywords||higher-order doubts or evidence|
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum (2016). The Uniqueness Thesis. Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.
David Christensen (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz (2015). Respecting All the Evidence. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.
Tomasz Wysocki (forthcoming). Arguments Over Intuitions? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
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