Supervenience and dependence
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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“Supervenience”, though a philosophers’ notion, has a venerable history. It was used by Leibniz to say that relations are nothing over and above the intrinsic properties of their relata, by Sidgwick to say that moral characteristics covary with non-moral ones, by Moore to say that the former are grounded in the latter, by Hare to say that they stand in some relation of strict implication and by Davidson to say that “mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics”. Here is what Robert Stal- naker says about the “intuitive ideas that motivate the attempts to articulate concepts of supervenience”: " To say that the A-properties or facts are supervenient on the B-properties or facts is to say that the A-facts are, in a sense, redundant, since they are already implicitly speciﬁed when one has speciﬁed all the B-facts. A-facts are not fact ‘over and above’ the B-facts, not something ‘separate’. To state an A-fact, or ascribe an A-property, is to describe the same reality in a diﬀerent way, at a diﬀerent level of abstraction, by carving the same world at diﬀerent joints. " Kim identiﬁes three key features of our concept of supervenience: covariance, depend- ency and nonreducibility. 1 Explanation, sometimes required for reducibility, is absent : supervenience claims state that some patterns of property covariation hold, without explaining why they hold. 2
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