Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (1):3-19 (2001)
|Abstract||Like many critics of Rawls, Habermas believes that the Original Position (OP) implicitly utilizes normative (and unargued for) assumptions. The author defends the OP by arguing that its basic concepts are the product of a rational reconstruction of the everyday know-how, or common sense, employed by citizens in democratic practices. The author identifies this reconstruction in Rawls's work but suggests that while this answers the charge of circularity, it raises the problem of contextual relativism. It is concluded that Rawls can avoid such relativism only on a stronger commitment to social scientific research in support of a more transcendental form of rational reconstruction.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Fred D. & Agostino (2004). The Legacies of John Rawls. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (3).
Marion Smiley (2004). Democratic Citizenship V. Patriarchy: A Feminist Perspective on Rawls. Fordham Law Review (5):1599-1627.
Alan Carter (2006). The Evolution of Rawls's Justification of Political Compliance: Part 1 of the Problem of Political Compliance in Rawls's Theories of Justice. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):7-21.
Fabienne Peter (2009). Rawlsian Justice. In Paul Anand, Prastanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice.
Philip Pettit (1974). A Theory of Justice? Theory and Decision 4 (3-4):311-324.
Matthew Clayton (2001). Rawls and Natural Aristocracy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):239-259.
William A. Edmundson (2002). Civility as Political Constraint. Res Publica 8 (3):217-229.
David A. Reidy (2004). Rawls on International Justice: A Defense. Political Theory 32 (3):291-319.
J. Pedersen (2012). Justification and Application: The Revival of the Rawls-Habermas Debate. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):399-432.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads6 ( #154,793 of 739,303 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?