Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):411-426 (2011)
This paper compares and contrasts two infinite regress arguments against higher-order theories of consciousness that were put forward by the Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). The two arguments differ considerably from each other, and they also differ from the infinite regress argument that scholars usually attribute to Dignāga or his followers. The analysis shows that the two philosophers, in these arguments, work with different assumptions for why an object-cognition must be cognised: for Dignāga it must be cognised in order to enable subsequent memory of it, for Dharmakīrti it must be cognised if it is to cognise an object
|Keywords||Buddhist epistemology Self-awareness Infinite regress Higher-order theories of consciousness|
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References found in this work BETA
Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Bimal Krishna Matilal (1986). Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Dan Zahavi, Evan Thompson & Mark Siderits (eds.) (2011). Self, No Self? Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
Jay L. Garfield (2006). The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate? Philosophy East and West 56 (2):201-228.
Citations of this work BETA
Alex Watson (2014). Light as an Analogy for Cognition in Buddhist Idealism (Vijñānavāda). Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):401-421.
Raffaele Torella (2014). Utpaladeva's Lost Vivṛti on the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Kārikā. Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (1):115-126.
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