The epistemic significance of disagreement

In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oup. 167-196 (2005)
Abstract
Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty
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    David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.

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    2009-05-15
    Cross-posted from http://mleseminar.wordpress.com/
    ...

    A lively discussion today of Tom Kelly’s 'The epistemic significance of disagreement'. The presentation is here. Some thoughts follow.

    It wasn’t entirely clear to us what kinds of disagreement was meant to be modelled by the proposal in the paper. Any disagreement, or only ones which persist over long periods and are resistant to resolution after lengthy discussion between peers? And are we to think of disagreement as stemming from differences in prior conditional credences (as Elga does), or from failures of logical omniscience, or from an arbitrary combination of the two? In what follows, I will assume the proposal is meant to apply to all disagreements, whatever their nature and their source, both for maximum generality, and because it will not always be clear from which source a particular disagreement stems.

    We noted that the proposal didn’t generalize straightforwardly to a Williamsonian conception of one’s evidence as identical ... (read more)