The epistemic significance of disagreement
In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oup (2005)
| Abstract | Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRichard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
Ralph Wedgwood (2010). The Moral Evil Demons. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
David Killoren (2010). Moral Intuitions, Reliability and Disagreement. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.
Axel Gelfert (2011). Who is an Epistemic Peer? Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan A. Neufeld & Robert B. Talisse (2010). Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):211-219.
Andrew Rotondo (2013). Undermining, Circularity, and Disagreement. Synthese 190 (3):563-584.
Brandon Carey (2011). Possible Disagreements and Defeat. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
Michael Thune (2010). Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.
Jonathan Matheson (2009). Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3):269-279.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads225 ( #969 of 549,065 )Recent downloads (6 months)19 ( #3,020 of 549,065 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
| Start a new thread | There is 1 thread in this forum |
| 2009-05-15 | |
|
Alastair Wilson
University of Birmingham |
Cross-posted from http://mleseminar.wordpress.com/
... A lively discussion today of Tom Kelly’s 'The epistemic significance of disagreement'. The presentation is here. Some thoughts follow. It wasn’t entirely clear to us what kinds of disagreement was meant to be modelled by the proposal in the paper. Any disagreement, or only ones which persist over long periods and are resistant to resolution after lengthy discussion between peers? And are we to think of disagreement as stemming from differences in prior conditional credences (as Elga does), or from failures of logical omniscience, or from an arbitrary combination of the two? In what follows, I will assume the proposal is meant to apply to all disagreements, whatever their nature and their source, both for maximum generality, and because it will not always be clear from which source a particular disagreement stems. We noted that the proposal didn’t generalize straightforwardly to a Williamsonian conception of one’s evidence as identical ... (read more)
Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/931
Reply
|
