David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. OUP 167-196 (2005)
Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Adam Elga (2007). Reflection and Disagreement. Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
David Christensen (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
Similar books and articles
Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
Ralph Wedgwood (2010). The Moral Evil Demons. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press
David Killoren (2010). Moral Intuitions, Reliability and Disagreement. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.
Axel Gelfert (2011). Who is an Epistemic Peer? Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan A. Neufeld & Robert B. Talisse (2010). Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):211-219.
Andrew Rotondo (2013). Undermining, Circularity, and Disagreement. Synthese 190 (3):563-584.
Brandon Carey (2011). Possible Disagreements and Defeat. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
Michael Thune (2010). Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.
Jonathan Matheson (2009). Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3):269-279.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads435 ( #1,410 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)80 ( #16,941 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?
|Start a new thread||There is 1 thread in this forum|
University of Birmingham
Cross-posted from http://mleseminar.wordpress.com/
A lively discussion today of Tom Kelly’s 'The epistemic significance of disagreement'. The presentation is here. Some thoughts follow.
It wasn’t entirely clear to us what kinds of disagreement was meant to be modelled by the proposal in the paper. Any disagreement, or only ones which persist over long periods and are resistant to resolution after lengthy discussion between peers? And are we to think of disagreement as stemming from differences in prior conditional credences (as Elga does), or from failures of logical omniscience, or from an arbitrary combination of the two? In what follows, I will assume the proposal is meant to apply to all disagreements, whatever their nature and their source, both for maximum generality, and because it will not always be clear from which source a particular disagreement stems.
We noted that the proposal didn’t generalize straightforwardly to a Williamsonian conception of one’s evidence as identical ... (read more)