The epistemic significance of disagreement

In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. OUP 167-196 (2005)
Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,439
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.

View all 41 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

515 ( #2,106 of 1,911,611 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

51 ( #11,736 of 1,911,611 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  is 1 thread in this forum
Cross-posted from

A lively discussion today of Tom Kelly’s 'The epistemic significance of disagreement'. The presentation is here. Some thoughts follow.

It wasn’t entirely clear to us what kinds of disagreement was meant to be modelled by the proposal in the paper. Any disagreement, or only ones which persist over long periods and are resistant to resolution after lengthy discussion between peers? And are we to think of disagreement as stemming from differences in prior conditional credences (as Elga does), or from failures of logical omniscience, or from an arbitrary combination of the two? In what follows, I will assume the proposal is meant to apply to all disagreements, whatever their nature and their source, both for maximum generality, and because it will not always be clear from which source a particular disagreement stems.

We noted that the proposal didn’t generalize straightforwardly to a Williamsonian conception of one’s evidence as identical ... (read more)