Philosophical Studies 137 (3):369 - 382 (2008)
|Abstract||Many recent attacks on consequentialism and several defenses of pluralism have relied on arguments for the incommensurability of value. Such arguments have, generally, turned on empirical appeals to aspects of our everyday experience of value conflict. My intention, largely, is to bypass these arguments and turn instead to a discussion of the conceptual apparatus needed to make the claim that values are incommensurable. After delineating what it would mean for values to be incommensurable, I give an a priori argument that such is impossible. It is widely accepted that value is conceptually tied to desire. I argue that, more specifically, it is proportional to merited desire strength. This connection gives one a metric of all value if there is any such thing. This metric entails that value is a complete ordering over all states of affairs, or, in other words, that value is commensurable.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mark A. Wrathall (1999). Practical Incommensurability and the Phenomenological Basis of Robust Realism. Inquiry 42 (1):79 – 88.
Stephen R. Grimm (2004). Value Incommensurability. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:221-232.
Donald Scherer (1984). Some Simple Rational Conflict Resolution Procedures for Incommensurable Values. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 6:17-26.
Chrisoula Andreou (2005). Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice. Ratio 18 (3):249–261.
Justin Klocksiem (2011). Moorean Pluralism as a Solution to the Incommensurability Problem. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):335 – 49.
Stephen Ellis (2008). The Main Argument for Value Incommensurability (and Why It Fails). Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):27-43.
James Griffin (1977). Are There Incommensurable Values? Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1):39-59.
Harold I. Brown (1983). Incommensurability. Inquiry 26 (1):3 – 29.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #51,617 of 722,745 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,745 )
How can I increase my downloads?