David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):639-666 (2000)
The problem of induction reminds us that science cannot wait for empirical hypotheses to be verified and Duhem’s problem reminds us that we cannot expect full refutations either. We must settle for something less. The shape of this something less depends on which features of full verification and refutation we choose to emphasize. If we conceive of verification and refutation as arguments in which evidence entails the hypothesis or its negation, then the central problem of the philosophy of science is to explicate a relation of confirmation or support that is weaker than full entailment but which serves, nonetheless, to justify empirical conclusions.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, John G. Bennett & Megan D. Higgs (2015). How to Undermine Underdetermination? Foundations of Science 20 (2):107-127.
Similar books and articles
John Norton (2011). Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm R. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V. 391-440.
Gerald Doppelt (2005). Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What Does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1076-1087.
David Miller (2007). The Objectives of Science. Philosophia Scientiæ 11 (1):21-43.
M. Reynolds (2001). An Axiomatization of Full Computation Tree Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (3):1011-1057.
Ilkka Niiniluoto (1990). Measuring the Success of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:435 - 445.
Adolf Grünbaum (1960). The Duhemian Argument. Philosophy of Science 27 (1):75-87.
James Hawthorne (2011). Confirmation Theory. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier
Joseph Agassi (1970). Positive Evidence in Science and Technology. Philosophy of Science 37 (2):261-270.
Massimiliano Badino (2004). An Application of Information Theory to the Problem of the Scientific Experiment. Synthese 140 (3):355 - 389.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #180,581 of 1,725,866 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #134,315 of 1,725,866 )
How can I increase my downloads?