The logic of success

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):639-666 (2000)
Abstract The problem of induction reminds us that science cannot wait for empirical hypotheses to be verified and Duhem’s problem reminds us that we cannot expect full refutations either. We must settle for something less. The shape of this something less depends on which features of full verification and refutation we choose to emphasize. If we conceive of verification and refutation as arguments in which evidence entails the hypothesis or its negation, then the central problem of the philosophy of science is to explicate a relation of confirmation or support that is weaker than full entailment but which serves, nonetheless, to justify empirical conclusions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation 		Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,709
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
    		•
    Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    John Norton, Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.
    Gerald Doppelt (2005). Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What Does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1076-1087.
    David Miller, The Objectives of Science.
    M. Reynolds (2001). An Axiomatization of Full Computation Tree Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (3):1011-1057.
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1990). Measuring the Success of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:435 - 445.
    Adolf Grünbaum (1960). The Duhemian Argument. Philosophy of Science 27 (1):75-87.
    James Hawthorne (2011). Confirmation Theory. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
    Joseph Agassi (1970). Positive Evidence in Science and Technology. Philosophy of Science 37 (2):261-270.
    Massimiliano Badino (2004). An Application of Information Theory to the Problem of the Scientific Experiment. Synthese 140 (3):355 - 389.
    Kevin Kelly, Why Probability Does Not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    7 ( #133,637 of 549,766 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #63,425 of 549,766 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    		There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums




    Applied ethicsEpistemologyHistory of Western PhilosophyMeta-ethicsMetaphysicsNormative ethics
    Philosophy of biologyPhilosophy of languagePhilosophy of mindPhilosophy of religionScience Logic and MathematicsMore ...
    Home | New books and articles | Bibliographies | Philosophy journals | Discussions | The Categorization Project | About PhilPapers | API | Contact us

    Hosted by The Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
    This site uses Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).

    Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
    All rights reserved by David Bourget and David Chalmers

    Page generated Sat May 25 22:57:51 2013 - Hash code: +mZLT1qs4JirZ9a+WfJRLg