David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 121 (1):27-41 (2004)
I defend the view that an individual''s welfareis in one respect enhanced by the achievementof her goals, even when her goals are crazy,self-destructive, irrational or immoral. This``Unrestricted View'''' departs from familiartheories which take welfare to involve only theachievement of rational aims, or of goals whoseobjects are genuinely valuable, or of goalsthat are not grounded in bad reasons. I beginwith a series of examples, intended to showthat some of our intuitive judgments aboutwelfare incorporate distinctions that only theUnrestricted View can support. Then, I show howthe view can be incorporated into a broadertheory of welfare in ways that do not produceimplausible consequences. This in hand, Ifinish by providing a more philosophicalstatement of the Unrestricted View and the casein its favor, and respond to some objections.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.
Ben Bradley (2007). A Paradox for Some Theories of Welfare. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):45 - 53.
Alexander Sarch (2012). Multi-Component Theories of Well-Being and Their Structure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):439-471.
Erik Angner (2011). Are Subjective Measures of Well-Being 'Direct'? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):115 - 130.
Jason Raibley (2013). Health and Well-Being. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):469-489.
Similar books and articles
Peter Lanz & David Mcfarland (1995). On Representation, Goals and Cognition. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):121 – 133.
G. Hardcastle (1999). Are There Scientific Goals? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 30 (3):297-311.
Don Fallis (2007). Collective Epistemic Goals. Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280.
Chris Heathwood (2011). Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmid (2005). Symposium on Rationality and Commitment: Introduction. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):1-3.
Lennart Nordenfelt (2001). On the Goals of Medicine, Health Enhancement and Social Welfare. Health Care Analysis 9 (1):15-23.
Armando Cíntora (2006). Are Impossible Goals Rational? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:113-119.
H. M. Nielsen, I. Olesen, S. Navrud, K. Kolstad & P. Amer (2011). How to Consider the Value of Farm Animals in Breeding Goals. A Review of Current Status and Future Challenges. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24 (4):309-330.
Douglas W. Portmore (2007). Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (2):1-28.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #25,848 of 1,098,414 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #57,129 of 1,098,414 )
How can I increase my downloads?