Reply to Heck on meaning and truth-conditions

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236 (2002)
Richard Heck has contested my argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. My reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct my argument
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00265
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References found in this work BETA
Gary Kemp (1998). Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):483-493.

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Gary Kemp (2014). II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.

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