Samesaying, propositions and radical interpretation

Ratio 14 (2):131–152 (2001)
Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation preserves the apparent relational structure of indirect speech but without assuming, in the Fregean manner, that the thing said by a sayer is a proposition. I argue that this is a mistake. As has been recognised by some critics, Davidson's account suffers from analytical shortcomings which can be overcome by redeploying the paratactic strategy as a means of referring to propositions. I offer a quick and comprehensive survey of these difficulties and a concise propositional solution. Further, I argue that Davidson's more general philosophical commitments provide no reason not to embrace the propositional strategy: despite appearances, to invoke propositions in the way suggested is consistent with Davidson's holism and consequent doctrine of semantic indeterminacy
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00151
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Gary Kemp (2014). II—Gary Kemp: Hyperintensional Truth Conditions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.
Gary Kemp (2014). II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.

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