David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Frank Jackson has a new objectivist and representationalist account of the content of colour-experience. I raise several objections both against the account itself and, primarily, against how he tries to support it. He argues that the new account enables us to see what is wrong with the so-called Opacity Puzzle. This alleged puzzle is an argument in which a seemingly implausible conclusion is derived from three premises of which seem plausible to an representationalist. Jackson’s diagnosis of the puzzle as a fallacy of equivocation is mistaken. The term ‘‘the property of being red’’ is not ambiguous in the way he claims it to be, and the puzzling argument is valid. Moreover, its conclusion is not implausible, so after all there is no real puzzle. I try to show how Jackson’s wrong diagnosis results from neglecting the diﬀerence between properties proper and properties as conceived in the light of a given property-concept.
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