David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2001)
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance.Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness - and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.
|Keywords||Ethics Will Self-control|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$15.00 used (75% off) $53.34 new (10% off) $59.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ45.K46 2001|
|ISBN(s)||0198236581 9780199266302 0199266301|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.
Jeanette Kennett (2006). Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.
Jessica Wolfendale (2008). Performance-Enhancing Technologies and Moral Responsibility in the Military. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (2):28 – 38.
Hanna Pickard (2015). Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):135-163.
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