David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):477 – 488 (2005)
Heidegger distinguishes between concern for things and solicitude for other Dasein. As Dasein is already being-in-the-world and being-with from the start, there is no need to define what another Dasein is to recognize it. In this paper it is argued that Dasein is thrown into circles of care, where the distinction between solicitude and concern is given. Although this undermines any attempts to regard a comatose patient as non-Dasein, it raises questions about Dasein's relations with animals. It is suggested that Dasein's relations with animals could be captured by inserting another circle, for which the German word versorgen might be suitable.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Josephine A. Seguna (2014). Disability: An Embodied Reality (or Space) of Dasein. Human Studies 37 (1):31-56.
Similar books and articles
Mariana Ortega (2000). Dasein Comes After the Episternic Subject, But Who Is Dasein? International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):51-67.
Mariana Ortega (2005). When Conscience Calls, Will Dasein Answer? Heideggerian Authenticity and the Possibility of Ethical Life. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):15 – 34.
Piotr Hoffman (2000). Heidegger and the Problem of Idealism. Inquiry 43 (4):403 – 411.
Kevin Aho (2007). Gender and Time: Revisiting the Question of Dasein's Neutrality. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (1):137-155.
Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback (2005). Die Gabe und Aufgabe des Währenden. Studia Phaenomenologica 5:201-214.
Quentin Smith (1991). Reply to Vallicella: Heidegger and Idealism. International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (2):231-235.
John Russon (2008). The Self as Resolution: Heidegger, Derrida and the Intimacy of the Question of the Meaning of Being. Research in Phenomenology 38 (1):90-110.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #264,208 of 1,911,554 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #457,720 of 1,911,554 )
How can I increase my downloads?