David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 56 (2):63–73 (1996)
It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that what we really want to do and what we most want to do are one and the same. But how is this meant to be so much as possible? It seems to require that our desire not to do what we most want to do is both our strongest desire and not our strongest desire. And that is a blatant contradiction. This is the so-called ‘paradox of self-control’ (Mele 1987). The aim of our paper is to explain how to make sense of the story of Frog and Toad.
|Keywords||self-control weakness of will will power|
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Citations of this work BETA
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2014). How is Willpower Possible? The Puzzle of Synchronic Self‐Control and the Divided Mind. Noûs 48 (1):41-74.
Derek Baker (2014). The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2):1-29.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). Philosophical Questions About the Nature of Willpower. Philosophy Compass 5 (9):793–805.
Constantine Sandis (2012). The Objects of Action Explanation. Ratio 25 (3):326-344.
Alfred R. Mele (2014). Self-Control, Motivational Strength, and Exposure Therapy. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):359-375.
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