Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency

Abstract
Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia and the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue for naïve realism and against representationalism and the qualia theory. I also examine the relationship between phenomenological study and phenomenal character, and discuss the results in connection with the argument from hallucination.
Keywords perception  naive realism  transparency  representationalism  qualia
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1999). Back to the Theory of Appearing. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):181--203.
William P. Alston (2005). Perception and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.

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Citations of this work BETA
Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
Matthew Kennedy (2010). Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.
Kenneth Hobson (2013). In Defense of Relational Direct Realism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.

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