David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604 (2009)
Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia and the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue for naïve realism and against representationalism and the qualia theory. I also examine the relationship between phenomenological study and phenomenal character, and discuss the results in connection with the argument from hallucination.
|Keywords||perception naive realism transparency representationalism qualia|
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gilbert Harman (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Charles Siewert (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.
Michael G. F. Martin (2002). The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.
Michael G. F. Martin (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Citations of this work BETA
Berit Brogaard (2015). Type 2 Blindsight and the Nature of Visual Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.
Michael Tye (2014). Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
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