Metaphor and knowledge attained via the body

Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):407 – 412 (1993)
Mark Johnson (1991) argues in favour of embodied experience as the basis for knowledge. An important implication of his analysis is that these experiences instigate pervasive metaphorical systems. Johnson's argument involves reductionist problems, chicken-and-egg problems and, at times, unclear criteria for what counts as a basic experience and a metaphor.
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Mark Johnson (1991). Knowing Through the Body. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):3-18.
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