Naive realism and experiential evidence

Abstract
I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs
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References found in this work BETA
Stewart Cohen (1984). Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
John Hawthorne & Karson Kovakovich (2006). Disjunctivism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):145-83.
Mark Johnston (2006). Better Than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness. In T.S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 260--290.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jeffrey Dunn (2012). Evidential Externalism. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.
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