Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety

Noûs 45 (1):77-102 (2011)
Abstract
Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind
Keywords naive realism  self knowledge  privileged access  safety  perception  epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,374
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1971). Varieties of Priveleged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41.
Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. In Christopher S. Hill (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. University of Arkansas Press. 5--26.

View all 33 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-31

Total downloads

155 ( #4,391 of 1,096,817 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #31,184 of 1,096,817 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.