Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety

Noûs 45 (1):77-102 (2011)
Abstract
Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind
Keywords naive realism  self knowledge  privileged access  safety  perception  epistemology
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    References found in this work BETA
    William P. Alston (1971). Varieties of Priveleged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41.
    Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. In Christopher S. Hill (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. University of Arkansas Press. 5--26.

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