The dutch book argument: Its logical flaws, its subjective sources

Philosophical Studies 36 (1):19 - 33 (1979)
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    A. Hajek (2008). Arguments for-or Against-Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
    Henry E. Kyburg (1983). Rational Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231.
    P. Pollard (1983). Confirming Confirmation Bias. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):258.

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