Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):156-157 (1999)
|Abstract||Discrimination of forms defined solely by color and discrimination of hue are dissociated in cerebral achromatopsia. Both must be based on potentially explicit information derived from differentially color-sensitive photoreceptors, yet only one gives rise to phenomenal experience of color. By analogy, visual information may be used to form explicit representations for action without giving rise to any phenomenal experience other than that of making the action.|
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