David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96 (2009)
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
|Keywords||Meta-ethics Moral judgment Automatic processing Moral intuitions Moral agency Reason-responding Reason-tracking|
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References found in this work BETA
Christine M. Korsgaard (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford University Press.
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B. Keith Payne, Larry L. Jacoby & Alan J. Lambert (2005). Attitudes as Accessibility Bias: Dissociating Automatic and Controlled Processes. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford University Press 393-420.
Citations of this work BETA
Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Joshua May (2014). Moral Judgment and Deontology: Empirical Developments. Philosophy Compass 9 (11):745-755.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2015). Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence. Consciousness and Cognition 33:548-560.
Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett (2010). Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency. Mind 119 (475):585-614.
Hanno Sauer (2011). Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):708-721.
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